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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In the face of Africa’s multiple security threats, integration and regionalisation endeavours 
are increasingly seen as providing opportunities for establishing sustainable economic 
growth, peace and stability, and securing democratic consolidation.  Thus, regional 
integration and co-operation groupings such as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are emerging as conflict managers 
in their respective regions. In response to regional conflict dynamics, some have come 
up with regional early warning and early response apparatus, such as the ECOWAS 
Early Warning Mechanism and the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Early Response 
Mechanism, CEWARN.  Projects such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), the UN Millennium Declaration, and the newly launched African Union (AU) 
have emphasised the role of regional economic communities in responding to Africa’s 
challenges. 
 
The one-day International Conference on Linking Peace, Security and Regional 
Integration in Africa, held at the University of Bradford, U.K., focused international 
attention and facilitated constructive dialogue with the policy community on the links 
between peace, security, conflict, development and regional integration in Africa. It 
generated both academic and policy-relevant debate that could potentially lead to the 
mainstreaming and institutionalisation of peace and security issues as an integral 
component of economic integration and co-operation in Africa. Jointly organized by the 
Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies within the Department of Peace Studies, 
University of Bradford, and the UNU/CRIS, based at the College of Europe, Bruges, 
Belgium, the conference had two broad objectives: 
 
1. To bring together academics, researchers and staff of the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) to share ideas on how to build policy-relevant knowledge 
and conceptual understanding that could enhance the capacity of  African 
regional organizations to respond to conflicts. 
2. To stimulate academic and policy debate on the link between peace, security, 
and regionalism in contemporary Africa. 
 
The conference was attended by 40 participants, including academics and researchers, 
and senior officials of RECs in Africa. 
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HIGHLIGHTS AND KEY RECCOMENDATIONS 
 
Prof. Grace Alderson, the Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Bradford, officially 
opened the conference, and Dr. Shaun Gregory, Head of the Peace Studies Department, 
offered welcoming remarks.  This was followed by an introductory plenary on 
‘Mainstreaming Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa: Discourses, Issues 
and Emerging Analyses’, that helped to lay the ground for the analysis of regional 
integration, peace and security in Africa.  Speakers in the plenary were Prof. Luk van 
Langenhove, Director, UNU/CRIS, college of Europe, Bruges, Belgium; Prof. Björn 
Hettne, Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, Sweden; 
and Dr. David Francis, Director, Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.  The 
opening plenary was followed by three other thematic panels, namely 1) Peace, Security 
and West Africa and Horn of Africa Regionalism, 2) Peace, Security and Regionalisation 
in Southern Africa and 3) Mainstreaming Peace, Security and Regional Integration: 
International Policy Options and Challenges.  Speakers in the three panels included Dr. 
Sunday Ochoche, Director-General, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, 
Nigeria; Dr. Marcel Leroy, EU Advisor to IGAD, IGAD Conflict Prevention and Peace 
Support Programme, Djibouti; Mr Brian Chigawa, Legal Affairs Officer and Coordinator, 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Peace and Security 
Programme, Lusaka, Zambia; Dr. Kojo Asiedu, Senior Advisor UNDP – ZMM-GT, 
Lusaka, Zambia; Dr. Wafula Okumu, Political Analyst, Conflict Management Centre, 
African Union (AU), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Ms Ameena Dennis, Africa Programme 
Coordinator, University for Peace, Geneva Office.  Presentations in each panel were 
followed by lively discussions.  Summaries of most of the presentations and the 
subsequent plenary discussions are presented in the body of this report.  
 
KEY RECCOMENDATIONS 
 
The following are the key recommendations of the conference. 
 
1. Compilation of the conference papers into an edited book 
2. Creation of a knowledge base on regional integration involving the 
documentation and analysis of experiences of regional integration, its successes and 
failures.  Systematic analyses would stress the added value of integration projects. 
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3. Multi-level capacity building: The need for capacity building featured prominently 
throughout the presentations and discussions at the conference.  Human resource 
development through training and exchange of experiences and financial capacities was 
identified as a key area of need.  In particular, there was concern for building proper 
understanding of needs between donors, such as the EU, and the regional organizations. 
 
4. Workshop on capacity needs of regional organizations: A workshop would 
establish priority thematic areas for capacity building, enable discussion of flexible 
learning techniques – such as CD-ROMs – to accommodate the time constraints of 
officers, and provide a networking forum for RECs. The workshop could also propose a 
schedule of training activities.  It was suggested that a capacity needs assessment be 
carried out prior to the workshop. 
 
5. Policy relevant research: A number of research issues were suggested. These 
included:  
 
a) Development of a methodological framework for analysing the foci of regional 
integration and rigorous theorizing around integration projects. 
 
b) War economies, including resource extraction in conflict areas and the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and how these relate to regional 
integration projects. 
 
c) The workings of, constraints on and capacities for early warning and response 
need to be researched. 
 
 
 
 
4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most African countries are challenged by a variety of complex socio-economic, political 
and development problems.  These are accompanied – and exacerbated – by multiple 
security threats.  The most devastating have been intra-state wars and armed conflicts, 
with considerable regional consequences due to their spread across borders and 
regionalisation.  The multiplicity of war and armed conflicts have clearly highlighted 
Africa’s lack of sustained capacity and inadequate expertise for conflict prevention, 
management, resolution and peacebuilding. 
 
Africa’s integration and regionalisation endeavours are increasingly seen as providing 
opportunities for establishing sustainable economic growth, peace and stability, and 
securing democratic consolidation.  Thus, on the one hand, regional integration and co-
operation groupings, such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, are emerging as conflict 
managers in their respective regions.  The regional conflict dynamics and consequences, 
and the imperative for conflict prevention, have led to the establishment of regional early 
warning and early response apparatus, such as the ECOWAS Early Warning Mechanism 
and the IGAD CEWARN.  However, ECOWAS peacekeeping in West Africa and SADC 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all been based on ad hoc 
improvisations, rather than long-term policy prescription and commitment on the part of 
the regional intergovernmental organizations.  On the other hand, projects such as 
NEPAD, the UN Millennium Declaration and the newly launched AU have placed 
emphasis on the role of regional economic communities in responding to Africa’s 
challenges.  
 
Jointly organized by the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies within the 
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and the UNU/CRIS based at the 
College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, the one-day International Conference on Linking 
Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa was an attempt to focus international 
attention and facilitate constructive dialogue with the policy community on the link 
between peace, security, conflict, development and regional integration in Africa. It was 
intended to generate both academic and policy-relevant debate that would potentially 
lead to the mainstreaming and institutionalisation of peace and security issues as an 
integral component of economic integration and co-operation in Africa.  The conference 
had two broad objectives: 
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1. To bring together academics, researchers and senior officers of the RECs to 
share ideas on how to build policy-relevant knowledge and conceptual 
understanding that could enhance the capacity of African regional organizations 
to respond to conflicts within the context of regional integration.   
 
2. To stimulate academic and policy-debate on the link between peace, security, 
and regionalism in contemporary Africa. 
 
The conference was attended by 40 participants, drawn from among academics and 
researchers, and representatives of RECs in Africa.  This report presents a summary of 
the highlights of the conference, including most of the papers presented and an outline of 
participants’ comments and discussions.  It concludes with the key recommendations and 
suggestions for the way forward. 
 
II. OFFICIAL OPENING 
 
The Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Bradford, Prof. Grace Alderson, officially 
opened the conference, and Dr. Shaun Gregory, Head of the Peace Studies Department, 
offered welcoming remarks. Prof. Alderson said the university was pleased to host such 
an auspicious conference and she apologised for not being able to participate fully, due 
to administrative commitments.  Dr. Gregory also said it was an honour for the 
Department of Peace Studies to be hosting such an historic conference on Africa.  He 
highlighted the various specialised centres that operate within Peace Studies, indicating 
that they are central to the work and life of the department.  These centres include the 
Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, the 
Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Bradford Disarmament Research 
Centre, and the International Centre for Participation Studies. Dr. Gregory concluded by 
wishing the participants fruitful discussions. 
 
III. THEMATIC SESSIONS 
1. MAINSTREAMING PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
IN AFRICA: DISCOURSES, ISSUES AND EMERGING ANALYSES 
 
This panel included Dr. David Francis (Director of the Africa Centre for Peace and 
Conflict Studies, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), Prof. Luk van 
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Langenhove (Director, UNU/CRIS, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium), and Prof. Björn 
Hettne of the Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, 
Sweden.  The chair was Prof. Malcom Chalmers of the Department of Peace Studies and 
Associate Dean of the School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford.   
 
Dr. Francis’ paper was titled ‘Mapping the Regional Integration Terrain in Africa: 
Contemporary Discourses, Emerging Research Issues and Policy Challenges’.  He 
began by presenting an overview of interpretations of contemporary regional integration 
in Africa.  There are those who argue that regional integration is the result of the 
‘integrative habit’ going back to the pre-colonial kingdoms and empires.  Others attribute 
it to the establishment of common services for the benefit of the British, French and 
Portuguese colonialists, with a number of common services being extended into the post-
colonial era.  Yet others point to the European integration model, which became 
attractive to leaders in Africa.  UN programmes such as the Latin American Economic 
Commission and the Economic Commission for Africa are also recognised as having 
played a leading role in promoting regional integration.  Finally, there are those who point 
to the dissatisfaction with the modernization concept of development and the emergence 
of the alternative development paradigm advocated by dependency theorists.  The 
African dependency theorists argued that the only way to get out of underdevelopment 
created by incorporation into the global capitalist system was to develop an alternative 
development strategy based on collective self-reliance through regional integration and 
co-operation. 
 
Dr. Francis then moved on to consider the discourses and interpretations used to explain 
regionalism and the motivations for the creation of regionalist projects. These discourses 
revolve around economic and developmental interpretations, politics of South-South co-
operation and African unity and identity.  Security is another dominant discourse, though 
mostly approached from the perspective of military security. Other discourses interpret 
regional integration from a normative perspective, viewing it as an end in itself, due to its 
potential for bringing about welfare, peace, development, security and democratic 
consolidation in Africa. 
 
On contemporary scenarios of integration in Africa, Dr. Francis identified what he called a 
shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ regionalism.  The ‘old’ regionalism of the 1960s and 70s was 
formal, state-centric, institutional-based, elite-driven and focused on official trade flow.  
‘New’ regionalism represents a departure from the purely state-led integration to a 
preoccupation with the interactions and transactions of the state, market, civil society, 
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and external actors, all of whom are involved in a complex formal and informal process of 
regionalisation. 
 
Another feature of contemporary regionalism in Africa is the expansion into the security 
domain.  Due to the challenges of armed conflict in Africa, the regionalisation projects 
have been forced to take on regional security responsibilities. Thus, ECOWAS, SADC 
and IGAD have been involved in peacemaking and mediation interventions in their 
respective regions.  Both ECOWAS and IGAD have established a conflict early warning 
and response mechanism.  The involvement in peace and security matters has in turn 
highlighted the emergence and role of regional hegemons, notably Nigeria in ECOWAS 
and South Africa in SADC. 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Francis highlighted some emerging research issues and policy 
challenges. First, given the numerous civil wars and their negative consequences on 
economic integration, more serious attention needs to be given to policy and research 
into the inextricable link between peace, security and regional integration in Africa.  
Secondly, to transform these regional groupings from ad hoc improvisers into conflict 
managers, a more constructive and long-term regional intergovernmental collective 
security policy (and even research into the implications of humanitarian intervention in 
complex political emergencies) is required.  Lastly, the multi-dimensional nature of 
regionalism in Africa calls for a multi-disciplinary research agenda that can offer 
alternative theoretical perspectives.  Such a research agenda would need to move 
beyond the rationalist and reflectivist perspectives that have dominated the mainstream 
interpretations of regionalism, to focus, for example, on the anthropological, sociological, 
psychological, and linguistic interpretations of regionalisms in Africa. 
 
Prof. Björn Hettne’s paper was on ‘The regional factor in conflict management: 
Research issues and policy challenges’.  He proposed a framework for the analysis of 
external involvement in conflict management, in the form of a ‘conflict circle’, which views 
a conflict as proceeding through six crucial elements.  He noted, however, that even 
though the framework is a useful analytical tool, it should not be assumed that there is a 
‘natural history of conflict’, that each conflict faithfully follows the six elements. Rather, 
each ‘stage’ in the circle is a potential exit point.  Briefly, the first element in the circle is 
‘provention’.  Introduced by Burton (1990), provention suggests that violent conflict can 
be avoided through the proactive implementation of policies that respond to or address 
potential sources of conflict.  This first ‘stage’ precedes the ‘conflict’, even in its latent 
form, and represents the normative position that conflict should be addressed at the 
earliest possible stage by dealing with structural root causes.  Prof. Hettne suggested 
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that developmental regionalism could be viewed as a means by which conflict-generating 
development processes can be eliminated at an early stage. 
 
‘Prevention’ is the next stage in the circle, and, in itself, indicates the failure of provention.  
Here we encounter the language of ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘conflict prevention’.  
Conflict prevention is confined to the period (or stage of the conflict cycle) after it has 
become manifest, but before it has turned violent.  The idea of prevention gained 
particular interest following the publication of Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (UN, 
1992), which called or early warning systems, fact-finding missions and confidence-
building measures. 
 
Failure of prevention and the eventual escalation of conflict ushers in the ‘intervention’ 
stage.  Although intervention mostly means military action to end conflict, it is important 
to keep in mind that intervention can also be in the form of civil involvement.  In this 
regard, provention and prevention are early forms of civil intervention.  Prof. Hettne 
distinguished between various forms of intervention, namely unilateral, bilateral, 
plurilateral, regional and multi-lateral, indicating that, at present, multi-lateralism remains 
the only legal, UN-backed intervention mechanism.  However, there is a distinction in 
international parlance and practice between ‘legal’ and ‘legitimate’ interventions.  
 
Intervention is followed by ‘settlement’ and then ‘resolution’.  Settlement indicates the 
formal end of conflict, and can be in the form of a treaty, a victory, or exhaustion.  
Resolution refers to post-conflict outcomes and could involve a new constitutional order 
that accommodates all, partitioning of the territory, regional integration, etc.  This then 
paves the way to the ‘reconstruction’ stage or nation building.  Reconstruction is not 
simply a physical exercise, but one that aims to create a new equilibrium by restoring the 
moral and social substance of society.  It is also a ‘second chance’ at provention.  And so 
the cycle starts all over again.  Development regionalism is a way to break vicious circles, 
and contains an important proventive factor by which conflict generating processes can 
be ‘prevented’ before they occur.  
 
On the future of conflict management, Prof. Hettne saw the continued domination of neo-
functionalist approaches in which regional bodies such as ASEAN in South-East Asia 
and ECOWAS in West Africa continue to play leading roles.  For this reason, there is the 
need for a comprehensive institutionalisation of regional conflict handling mechanisms.  
The strengthening of regional mechanisms should not compete with the role of the UN.  
This would amount to an artificial notion of delegation of conflict management, a role that 
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primarily belongs to the UN.  Rather, regional mechanisms should be seen to 
complement the role of the UN in the form of burden sharing. 
 
Finally, regarding security and development, Prof. Hettne noted that there is a risk of 
what he called ‘securitization of the development discourse’, in which development 
concerns are subordinated to those of security, particularly since September 11.  In this 
way, development becomes a tool for achieving security.  Prof. Hettne argued that 
development should remain a central goal in itself. 
 
Prof. van Langenhove’s paper was titled ‘The Relevance of New Regionalism in 
Africa’. He argued that there is increased recognition of the potential for regional 
integration to improve Africa’s socio-economic situation; even though regional integration 
in itself is not a new thing.  Because of Africa’s small economies, and in the face of global 
competition, integration could minimize the costs of market fragmentation.  Currently 
some 27 African countries belong to at least one REC and 18 belong to as many as three 
RECs.  Nevertheless, Prof. van Langenhove argued, this enthusiasm for integration has 
not resulted in much concrete achievement.  Reasons for this poor achievement include 
government reluctance to cede sovereignty, structural instability due to conflicts, and 
poor institutional design. 
 
In spite of these failures, regional integration in Africa remains promising.  A ‘second 
wave’ of regionalisation followed the signing of the Abuja Treaty on the African Economic 
Community in 1991.  This second wave of the 1990s goes beyond trade to encompass 
security and regional goods such as the management of water basins, infrastructure, 
energy and the environment.  Beyond the state, the second wave has also involved 
industry and civil society.  This second wave of regionalisation has been referred to as 
New Regionalism.  Essentially, New Regionalism potentially allows small countries to 
have a voice, alongside larger states, and allows poor countries to integrate more easily 
in the world economy.  It can allow developing countries to reap maximum benefits from 
globalisation and, at the same time, serve to protect them from the downside of 
globalisation. 
 
Prof. van Langenhove noted that regional integration is a complex process that takes 
time and requires the underpinning of academic research.  In this regard, he highlighted 
the role and interest in regional integration of the United Nations University (UNU). Out of 
UNU’s and partners’ work has emerged a theoretical framework named the New 
Regionalism Approach (NRA).  NRA conceptualises integration as a multi-dimensional 
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and socially constructed phenomenon, where co-operation occurs across economic, 
political, security and environmental matters, and involves state and non-state actors.   
 
In order to help build policy-relevant knowledge about new forms of regional governance 
and co-operation, UNU set up in 2001 a new research and training programme in Bruges,  
Belgium, focused on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU/CRIS).  The 
programme aims to contribute to the visioning of multi-level regional governance in Africa, 
capacity building within governments, industry and civil society actors, and the monitoring 
of implementation and impact assessment.   
 
Finally, Prof. Van Langenhove addressed himself to the linkages between peace, 
security and regional integration.  He acknowledged there is a debate as to whether 
regionalism enhances or undermines the achievement of a universal approach to global 
problems.  More specifically, are regional organizations weakening the UN or can they be 
regarded as the UN’s allies in dealing with supranational problems such as peace and 
security?  Prof. Van Langenhove was of the opinion that regional organizations are not 
contradictory to the UN mission.  The complementary relationship is indicated by the 
regional distribution of the 10 non-permanent seats in the Security Council.  The UN 
Charter also gives priority to regional agencies and arrangements in the peaceful 
settlement of disputes.  However, regional agencies and arrangements cannot take 
enforcement action without the authority of the Security Council.  Nevertheless, the end 
of the Cold War has had the effect of expanding the potential role regions can play as the 
‘first line’ in peace and security matters.  For this potential to be realised, divisions of 
labour between the UN and regional organizations need to be further developed.   
 
Plenary Discussions 
 
How do we frame the debate?  The view was expressed that what appears to be a 
‘new’ and ‘promising’ regionalism in Africa is in fact an old agenda.  Rather what is 
needed is an ‘audit’ to establish what has worked, what has failed, and why.  A counter-
view was that whereas regionalism may not be new, as such, there is a fresh interest in it 
among African leaders, as well as increased recognition of the informal and civil society 
aspects of regional integration.  Secondly, there is increased recognition of its potential to 
contribute to regional peace, stability, development and democratic consolidation. 
 
Is there too much or too little funding?  One perspective is that there is more than 
adequate external donor funding to African regional projects, with funding, for example, 
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for the successful reform and capacity building of the police and the military in East 
African countries.  This view was however contested and rejected in both this and 
subsequent panels.  Instead, the view emerged from the representatives of the RECs 
that there is a huge gap between what is pledged and what is paid, and another gap 
between what is paid and what ends up being utilized for the stated projects.  This state 
of affairs reflects the unfavourable funding policies of the key donors.   
 
Focus on regional or national institutions? It was suggested that regionalism could be 
helped by the presence of stable national institutions.  As such, new regionalism ought to 
embrace a strategy for ensuring state-formation and development of national institutions 
as the building blocks for regional institutions.  This calls for micro- or sub-regionalism 
that incorporates both formal and civil society dimensions.  It was pointed out that 
regionalism in Africa has had the effect of both transcending sovereignty on the one hand, 
and strengthening it on the other.  In this regard, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
would represent transcendence of sovereignty, while its insistence on the sanctity of 
borders represents an affirmation of it.  Regionalism confronts the question of what the 
ideal size of a sovereign state ought to be.  Regionalism and devolution of power seem to 
go hand in hand. 
 
From analysis to action?  A question was raised on whether the analysis of new 
regionalism is also concerned with analysing and acting or urging action on economic 
problems in Africa.  In response, the presenters argued that there is a legitimate and 
useful role in studying and generating new ideas about regional integration and leaving 
advocacy or promotional roles to other sectors who can use such studies.  
 
Regionalism and responsibility for the ‘African burden’: Concern was expressed 
about whether the new interest by the West in regionalism and role of African institutions 
was not in reality a convenient excuse by Western countries to relinquish the ‘burden’ of 
Africa, especially in relation to its conflicts.  It was suggested that the answer to this 
question could only be both yes and no.  There is indeed an apprehension in the West 
regarding intervention in Africa’s problems especially after the UN and America’s 
experiences in Somalia, and the subsequent and costly indecision concerning Rwanda.  
At the same time, there is a genuine concern for developing Africa’s capacity to assume 
responsibility for peace, conflict management and economic development in Africa. 
 
Africa’s diversity: Analysis of Africa ought to recognize that Africa is very diverse, not a 
single entity.  The colonial legacy varies according to who was the colonial power, and 
also among countries with the same colonial power.  Analysis should therefore avoid 
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untenable generalizations, but could attempt to offer general categories.  These 
considerations should be taken into account when carrying out research on peace, 
security and regional integration in Africa. 
 
Environmental dimension of regionalism: The environmental dimension should be 
central to analysis of regional integration.  For Africa, the waters of the Nile and the 
Zambezi hold great implications for conflict, security, integration and development. 
 
Objectives and realities of regional integration: Regionalism embraces various 
objectives, including management of migrations, promotion of trade, common security 
and common currency.  In reality, however, some of these objectives, such as migrations 
and trade, are rarely state-sanctioned.  In addition, market-focused integration overlooks 
the often missing but important physical and infrastructural integration.   
 
In concluding, Prof. Chalmers noted that the panel had raised important issues regarding 
the kind of research ideas that could be followed up, and the capacity needs of regional 
integration projects.  The chair also suggested that it would be useful to address, with 
regard to Africa regionalism projects, the question of what has worked, what has not and 
why.   
 
 
2. PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: WEST AFRICA 
AND HORN OF AFRICA REGIONALISM 
 
Panelists in this session included Dr. Sunday Ochoche, Director-General, Institute for 
Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Nigeria, and Dr. Marcel Leroy, European Union 
Advisor to IGAD’s Conflict Prevention and Peace Programme, Dijibouti.  A third paper by 
Ms Florence Iheme, who could not attend the conference, was tabled.  Ms Iheme is the 
ECOWAS Early Warning Mechanisms and Conflict Prevention Programme Manager, 
Abuja, Nigeria.  The session chair was Dr. Mary Farrell, Senior Researcher at UNU/CRIS 
Bruges, Belgium.   
 
In his presentation on ‘The nexus between peace, security and regional integration 
in the ECOWAS region: Policy implications’, Dr. Ochoche explained that, although 
formed for purposes of economic integration, ECOWAS has had to respond to the 
challenges of conflicts in the region.  For this reason, its peacekeeping and intervention 
arm, ECOMOG, was incorporated as a legal mechanism within ECOWAS.  Since its 
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inception, ECOMOG has been deployed in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and 
Côte d’Ivoire.  ECOMOG peacekeeping has faced numerous challenges, but it also a 
model of what regional institutions could do with limited resources and capacity.  Dr. 
Ochoche argued that, although many regional projects have articulated good conflict 
response mechanisms, these often failed to recognize the reality of the political 
environment within which they were expected to function. For this reason, many 
mechanisms are good on paper but weak on implementation.  By far the greatest 
challenge to ECOWAS regionalism is the lack of political will, which is tied up with 
national pride and claims of sovereignty.  For example, Senegal would not allow 
intervention in the Casamance conflict, as this would infringe on their sovereignty.  Other 
challenges to ECOWAS include issues of nationality and migration, which are becoming 
increasingly thorny.  The region is also very diverse: economically, climatically, 
demographically and linguistically, making integration more difficult.  The diversity, and 
especially the Franco and Anglophone divide means that some countries have resisted 
Nigeria’s role as the regional hegemon. 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Ochoche argued that structures and mechanisms for overseeing 
integration needed to be carefully thought through and put in place.  Secondly, regional 
integration should be viewed from within a larger democracy project for the region.  Lastly, 
adequate funding is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the goals of both 
ECOWAS and ECOMOG. 
 
Dr. Marcel Leroy’s presentation was titled ‘Toward a division of labour in African 
security: African Union and the sub-regional groupings in eastern and southern 
Africa’.  He noted that the end of the Cold War had opened up possibilities for closer 
links between RECs and academia.  However, the changed international environment 
after the Cold War had also led to a proliferation of actors in security matters and an 
increased potential for ‘mischief’.  The newly inaugurated AU is set to launch a Peace 
and Security Council.  However, the parallel promotion of NEPAD is seen as an attempt 
to sell to the West ‘a sexy tool’ that is devoid of the problems associated with the OAU 
and its successor, the AU. 
 
With regard to IGAD, Dr. Leroy noted that Ethiopia plays the role of the regional 
hegemon.  Although IGAD has funding challenges, it has been better funded than the 
OAU, if one compares the budgets of the two institutions against their staffing capacities.   
 
The IGAD region needs to develop its capacity and a culture of cooperation, through 
mechanisms such as joint military operations and exercises.  Dr. Leroy noted that before 
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the war, Ethiopia and Eritorea had a Joint Border Commission.  This commission broke 
up just before the war and no records of its work were kept.  There needs to be proper 
coodination between regional and continental actors, among donors, and between the 
donors and African projects.  
 
Plenary Discussions 
 
A number of issues emerged in the subsequent discussions. 
 
Role of Nigeria: Although the Anglo-Francophone divide continues to be an issue in 
defining Nigeria’s role as the region’s hegemon, it was argued that the region needs 
Nigeria.  This is evidenced by Nigeria’s dominance in the peacekeeping operations of 
ECOMOG, in terms of military equipment, personnel and funding. 
 
Lack of Capacities: Regional integration and security projects suffer from poor capacity, 
both in terms of material and human resources.  Capacity for conflict early warning 
remains low, though IGAD has had a successful programme of training and capacity 
building in early warning, known as CEWARN. 
 
Selective Capacity building: In the name of fostering efficiency or control, there is often 
selective funding and capacity building within the same institution. Thus donors may shun 
the OAU secretariat, but fund OAU’s Conflict Mechanism, contributing to tensions within 
the organization. 
 
Role of civil society: There were different views about the role of civil society in issues 
such as early warning.  One view was that in many countries civil society organizations 
are ahead of governments in their analysis of conflicts and tensions, and in building 
capacity for early warning through training.  In this regard, collaboration between 
governments and civil society would be beneficial.  A counter-view was that civil society 
is usually subject to the same schisms or fault lines that run across society in general and 
cannot, therefore, be viewed as an impartial actor. 
 
The Chair for the session concluded by highlighting the recurrent themes of training and 
capacity building for regional integration and security projects as evident needs.   
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3. PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONALISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
There were two speakers in this session.  Mr Brian Chigawa is the Legal Affairs Officer 
and Coordinator of the COMESA Peace and Security Programme.  Dr. Kojo Asiedu is a 
Senior Advisor, UNDP – ZMM-GT. Both are based in Lusaka, Zambia.  The session was 
chaired by Dr. Donna Pankhurst of the Peace Studies Department and Associate Dean, 
School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford.   
 
Mr Brian Chigawa presented a paper on ‘Mainstreaming Peace, Security and 
COMESA Regionalism: Emerging Policy Challenges’. He indicated that COMESA is a 
20-member community stretching the length of the continent and involving cross-cutting 
membership to other bodies.  Thus, about half of the member states of COMESA are 
members of the SADC, while all members of the IGAD are COMESA members.  
Furthermore, two of the members of the East African Community (EAC) are members of 
COMESA, as are almost all the members of the Indian Ocean Commission.  COMESA 
has actively established formal and informal working relationships with the other sub-
regional organizations to reduce duplication of programmes. To date COMESA has 
formal agreements with all the above-mentioned sub-regional organizations, including 
ECOWAS and the AU. With SADC, there is now a task force at the Secretariat which 
meets every three months to discuss issues of harmonisation of programmes and their 
joint implementation. 
 
Highlighting COMESA’s successes, Mr Chigawa noted that it is the first economic bloc in 
Africa to attain a Free Trade Area, involving 9 of the 20 members.  Increased intra-
COMESA trade and inflow of Foreign Direct Investment in the COMESA region have led 
to the creation of regional jobs.  Sadly, these gains have been eroded by the estimated 
$13 billion in lost economic opportunities as a result of armed conflicts in the region. 
 
In its objectives, COMESA envisages a clear linkage between peace, security and 
sustainable development.  Although member states of COMESA have recorded 
significant gains in their economic integration and movement towards sustainable 
economic development, it is clear that more progress could have been made if some 
member states were not hindered by wars and insecurity.  Examples of member states 
experiencing conflict include Burundi, the Comoros, the DRC and Rwanda.  Mr Chigawa 
argued that during the last ten years almost half the member states of COMESA have 
been involved in armed conflicts.  Somalia, a member of COMESA’s predecessor, the 
Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), failed to make it through 
the transition as a result of the continuing armed conflict in the country.   
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Mr Chigawa emphasised that COMESA member states are keenly aware that peace and 
security are fundamental pre-requisites to sustainable economic development.  For this 
reason, the Heads of State and Government Summit in 1999 mandated their foreign 
affairs ministers to meet at least once a year to consider modalities of addressing issues 
of peace and security.  Before this decision, COMESA had made attempts to address 
issues of peace and security on an ad hoc basis using its staff at the Secretariat.  Such 
efforts included, among others, mediation in the conflicts between Sudan and Uganda, 
and between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Little was achieved by such initiatives, either because 
of their late timing or lack of a framework or mechanism for dealing with the conflicts 
between member states.  Efforts were also hindered by a lack of capacity in conflict 
handling skills within the regional body. 
 
COMESA now has a framework for addressing issues of peace, security and conflict 
prevention through preventive diplomacy.  A unique feature of this framework is the 
inclusion of non-governmental and civil society actors.  The setting up of the framework 
was preceded by a programme of capacity building among public representatives, such 
as members of parliament and senators.  In 2002, through this capacity development 
initiative, COMESA trained about 70 members of parliament from the region in conflict 
prevention through preventive diplomacy.  COMESA also has a Court of Justice which, 
besides its core mandate of deciding on trade disputes, can be used to address conflicts 
between member states mainly through its arbitration powers.   
 
In conclusion, Mr Chigawa argued that even though the core role of COMESA, like other 
RECs, is to promote economic development, it cannot ignore social and political issues 
that affect the well-being of the people, especially armed conflicts and insecurity.  
Involvement in issues of conflict and insecurity stresses the need for the RECs to build 
their capacities in this area. 
 
Dr. Kojo Asiedu’s paper was titled ‘Potential Peace and Security Dividends From 
Micro-Regionalism: The Case of the Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique Growth Triangle’. 
It focused on ‘Growth Triangles’ (GTs) and their effect on the domestic and external 
security interests and objectives of participating states.  Dr. Asiedu defined GTs as ‘trans-
national economic zones spread over geographically neighbouring areas, in which 
differences in factor endowments of three or more countries are exploited to promote 
external trade and direct investment for the mutual benefit of the participating countries.’ 
GTs can be viewed as part of ‘informal regionalism mechanisms’ which include GTs, 
Development Corridors and Economic Areas.  These can be contrasted with the more 
formal approaches such as Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, and Common Markets.  
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Dr. Asiedu argued that whereas formal mechanisms adopt common rules and a ‘top-
down’ approach to accelerating trade and investment, informal mechanisms try to avoid 
the slow pace this entails by adopting instead, more pragmatic, ‘bottom-up’ approaches. 
GTs are normally market- and private sector-driven. 
 
Dr. Asiedu’s paper focused on the ZMM-GT.  Started in 1999, the ZMM-GT follows the 
model and experience of more than 10 Asian GTs.  The ZMM-GT shares the objective of 
strengthening integration with other regional initatives, such as SADC and COMESA.  It, 
however, emphasises collaboration between contiguous districts or regions of 
participating countries with substantial similarities, such as socio-economic development, 
economic structure, and sometimes even a common cultural heritage. 
 
With regard to the relationship between GTs and peace and security, Dr. Asiedu argued 
that the GTs in South East Asia have had both security-enhancing as well as security-
diminishing implications.  Firstly, the Asian GTs have brought together former enemies 
and countries with different political and economic ideologies in fruitful collaboration.  
Economic collaboration has also led to confidence building among the countries, making 
the possibility of inter-state conflicts quite remote.  This is despite the fact that several 
East Asian countries have a number of unresolved territorial disputes with one another.  
Secondly, because of the fostering of rapid growth, the GTs have contributed to the 
‘performance legitimacy’ of the governments of the region, ensuring domestic and 
regional stability.  The downside of the GTs is that they usually target particular regions 
of countries rather than the entire country.  As a result, they have the potential to 
accentuate cleavages along political, ethnic or religious lines.  Perceptions of unequal 
gains by the participating countries can also be a source of discontent.  Dr. Asiedu 
observed that most conflicts in Asia and Africa occur along marginalized border areas.  
The GTs are, by definition, intended to function along such areas.  This sometimes raises 
questions of diversion of resources to these areas.  These factors diminish, rather than 
enhance, peace and security. 
 
Dr. Asiedu concluded that, for progress to be made, the pursuit of economic integration 
must go hand in hand with that of political stability at the national level and political 
cooperation at the sub-regional level.  The ZMM-GT can enhance its complementary role 
in sub-regional integration by incorporating in its work issues on the causes of conclict.   
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Plenary Discussions 
 
The key issues in the discussions that followed included: 
 
Private Sector’s role in GTs: given that the private sector is driven only by profit, is the 
ZMM-GTs’ vision of ‘bottom-up’ integration realistic?  It was argued that the GTs may not 
deliver growth as intended.  The private sector is different from the grass roots.  
 
Illegal trade and conflict: illegal trade in arms and resources such as minerals and oil 
plays a major role in sustaining conflict and its spread across borders.  COMESA 
recognizes this problem and is working on a programme on small arms.  
 
Funding Challenge: it was emphasised that there is usually a great mismatch between 
the pledge or reported funding, and the actual amounts that are finally availed to the 
regional bodies.  This creates an unfair impression that the bodies have resources but 
are not delivering on their mandates.  
 
 
4. MAINSTREAMING PEACE, SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 
 
Panelists in this session included Dr. Wafula Okumu, Political Analyst, Conflict 
Management Centre, AU, and Ms Ameena Dennis, Africa Programme Coordinator, 
University for Peace, Geneva Office.  The session was chaired by Prof. Luk van 
Langenhove.   
 
In her paper titled ‘Mainstreaming Education for Peace into Regional Integration 
Programmes’, Ms Dennis noted that, given the dreary picture of the reality of conflict, 
regional peace and security is increasingly recognized as an indispensable pre-requisite 
for the realization of economic integration and development objectives in Africa.  
Reversing the trends and culture of violence, and inculcating values of peace can only be 
brought about through long-term education for peace.  Ms Dennis noted that any type of 
education is a life-long process, aimed at expanding the knowledge base of individuals 
so that they are able to make wise and informed decisions on issues which have a 
bearing on their lives.  Education for Peace aims to empower people to understand the 
complex, dynamic, and inter-connected world in which we live.  Education for peace 
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needs to combine both formal and informal strategies and wave together intellectual and 
experiential aspects.   
 
Ms Dennis argued that education for peace faces the challenge of organizing and 
developing sufficient capacity to alter the course of violence and secure lasting and 
meaningful peace.  Civil society organizations (CSOs) have an enormous potential within 
Africa for fostering a culture of peace and sustainable development, but are severely 
limited in terms of capacity building and resources.  CSOs can work in close collaboration 
with academic institutions in the provision of short-term courses and training programmes 
in peace and conflict studies.   
 
To achieve the goals of an encompassing education for peace programme, Ms Dennis 
suggested that a range of activities should be undertaken.  These include academic 
teaching and training, raising awareness and mobilizing society for peace and research-
backed policy development.  Academic teaching and training is needed to generate 
skilled human resources, and could make use of alternative pedagogical tools such as e-
learning, distance education and mixed modes of learning.  Community-based peace 
education could aid awareness creation through innovative, informal and culturally 
appropriate modes of education such as radio, theatre, music, and the performing arts.  
In its turn, rigorous and policy-oriented research would not only inform academic teaching 
and training, but also influence national and international policy processes.  Also, 
research could highlight the lessons learnt from undocumented Africa-led peace 
processes such as those of CSOs, regional groupings like IGAD, and UN Secretary 
General’s special representatives.  
 
Ms Dennis also highlighted the role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
in promoting human resource and capacity development, and knowledge sharing.  Two 
main components have been identified as relevant for the harnessing of ICT and 
acceleration of education for peace in Africa.  These are the diversification of sources of 
knowledge, and acceleration of information exchange.  Key themes under the 
diversification of sources of knowledge include the development by African academics of 
Africa-specific materials and their dissemination via DVD/CD-ROM and/or the Internet; 
exploration of technology-enhanced flexible learning and mixed modes of delivery; 
working with the media in raising popular awareness, especially among those without 
formal education; use of traditional African media and cultural expressions; supporting 
the retrieval, management and preservation of valuable archives and historical 
documents. Key themes under the acceleration of information exchange include making 
use of ICT to connect researchers, practitioners and policy makers within and outside 
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Africa; exploring and encouraging the sharing of lessons learned and case study material 
through ICT as a way of overcoming publishing barriers which stop African academics 
from publishing their research; supporting the development of regional and sub-regional 
early warning mechanisms, and the training and equipment to develop databases and 
monitoring systems; sharing lessons learned; facilitating the development and sharing of 
curricula within Africa and other regions to promote South/South cooperation. 
 
Finally, Ms Dennis noted that, for regional organizations to fully fulfil their mandates in the 
field of peace and security, there is a requirement to build the capacity and expertise 
within the regional organizations, to fully appreciate the interfaces between poverty, 
conflict, development, security and regional integration.  In this regard, the University for 
Peace proposed a capacity-building workshop for officials of African regional 
organizations.  Such a workshop would aim to identify the existing capacity of staff in the 
regional organizations to understand the linkages between peace, security, and regional 
integration, and establish priority thematic areas for capacity-building training 
programmes. 
 
Plenary Discussions 
 
Discussion after the presentations revolved around the role of the AU and the 
practicalities of education for peace. 
 
The nexus between AU, NEPAD, mineral wealth and conflict management: A 
question was raised regarding how AU’s handling of conflicts in Africa interfaces with the 
new approach to Africa’s development, as advocated through the NEPAD initiative.  The 
particular case of conflict in the DRC was brought up, where mineral wealth is said to be 
driving the involvement of neighbouring countries.  It is a major embarrassment and a 
test to the vision of NEPAD that millions have died in the DRC even as NEPAD tries to 
present a new resolve to address Africa’s problems.   
 
‘War economies’ and research: Conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia, the DRC 
and Sierra Leone raise the issue of war economies, where resources such as oil, timber 
and diamonds have become the ‘silent agents’ for the prolongation and fuelling of conflict.  
Researching the causal links between mineral wealth and war, and exposing the actors 
involved is a risky undertaking and researchers would need special protection. 
 
Role of regional hegemons in the AU: The role that regional hegemons can play in 
regional peace and security was revisited, with the argument that regional hegemons, 
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such as Nigeria in West Africa, are indispensable.  These hegemons are particularly 
important to the proposed Peace and Security Council of the AU.  It was, however, 
pointed out that regional hegemons, besides their military might, also need to be 
exemplary in terms of democratic practice in order to take up regional responsibilities.  
 
A people-centred AU: There was the view that the OAU, and now the AU, has been a 
club of secretariat bureaucrats and politicians.  The AU needs to take advantage of the 
transition from the OAU to truly transform itself into a people-centred political community. 
 
OAU’s successes and lessons: Assessments of the OAU are often too harsh.  Even as 
the AU seeks to transform itself, the lessons and successes of the OAU should be built 
upon, not discarded.  Such lessons include the OAU’s role in the liberation struggles and 
the handling of inter-state disputes arising from national boundaries.   
 
The paradox of successful conflict prevention and resolution: Successes in conflict 
prevention and resolution are never publicised, while the conflicts are visible and 
publicised.  This creates the impression that no conflict prevention or resolution initiatives 
have worked.   
 
Value addition and impact: In the face of the various ongoing peace programmes in 
Africa, the University for Peace needs to think carefully about what values it wants to add.  
Education cannot easily be quantified and its impact can certainly not be realized in a 
short period of time.  It therefore needs to be thought of as a long-term engagement.   
 
The place of ‘traditional mechanisms’: These need to be highlighted and promoted.  
However, ‘traditional mechanisms’ should not be taken to refer only to what worked in the 
past.  There are examples of traditional mechanisms that are operating today, e.g. the 
gacaca system in Rwanda. 
 
Information sharing and knowledge base: There are various ongoing initiatives that 
could offer lessons for others.  For example, COMESA has been working with traditional, 
faith-based and trade union conflict resolution mechanisms.  Sharing of such initiatives 
should be encouraged.  
 
What kind of education? Investment in education should address the question of what 
kind of education is on offer.  Having educated people in a country does not guarantee 
peace, as evidenced by Sierra Leone which has some of the most educated people in 
Africa.  
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IV. CLOSING PLENARY  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD 
 
The closing plenary was jointly facilitated by Prof. Van Langenhove, Ms Dennis and Dr. 
Francis.  The following general conclusions and suggestions for the way forward 
emerged at the end of the conference. 
 
1. Production of an edited book 
 
It was agreed that the papers presented at the conference, along with additional ones to 
be solicited, would be published as an edited book.  The publication of the papers would 
serve to outline the emerging discourses, research issues and policy challenges on the 
link between peace, security and regional integration in Africa.  The published book 
would additionally encourage continuation of the academic and policy debate on the 
subject. 
 
 
2. Creation of a knowledge base on regional integration 
 
The creation of a knowledge base calls for the documentation and analysis of 
experiences of regional integration, highlighting both the successes and the failures. 
Systematic analyses would stress the added value of integration projects. 
 
3. Multi-level capacity building 
 
The need for capacity building featured prominently throughout the presentations and 
discussions at the conference.  Human resource development through training and 
exchange of experiences and financial capacities were identified as key areas of need. In 
particular, there was concern for building proper understanding of needs between donors, 
such as the EU, and the regional organizations. 
 
4. Cultivation of a broad base of society support for RECs 
 
RECs need to work closely with civil society institutions and politicians in order to gain 
the necessary support from society.  RECs have largely remained the exclusive domain 
of politicians and policy makers.  
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5. Division of labour 
 
A clear division of labour between regional, continental and UN bodies is needed in order 
to avoid the appearance or perception of duplication and confusion.  Such a division of 
responsibilities would best be achieved through a multilateral approach. 
 
6. Policy relevant research  
 
The following were suggested as possible areas of research:  
 
a) The state regional integration and its dynamics in Africa 
 
b) Development of a methodological framework for analysing the foci of 
regional integration and rigorous multidisciplinary theorizing of integration 
projects 
 
c) The role and workings of war economies, including such issues as 
resource extraction in conflict areas and the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons, and how these relate to regional integration projects 
 
d) The workings of, constraints and capacities for conflict early warning and 
early response mechanisms 
 
e) To what extent are regional integration projects embedded in the 
aspirations of the citizens? 
 
7. Workshop on capacity building for regional organizations 
 
A proposal to organize a workshop on the capacity building needs of regional 
organizations was made and discussed.  Such a workshop would establish priority 
thematic areas for capacity building, enable discussion of flexible learning techniques – 
such as CD-ROMs – to accommodate the time constraints of officers, and provide a 
networking forum for RECs.  The workshop could also propose a schedule of training 
activities.  
 
The participants endorsed the proposed workshop and made the following points: 
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a) COMESA Secretariat fully supports the idea of a workshop and would work with 
the Africa Centre and UNU/CRIS towards its organization.  An earlier workshop 
for COMESA Members of Parliament clearly demonstrated specific capacity 
building needs for COMESA countries.  
 
b) It was suggested that a capacity needs assessment be carried out prior to the 
workshop. The report of the needs assessment could then be fed into the 
workshop. UNU/CRIS offered to follow up on the needs assessment study and 
suggested asking the Jordan-based UNU Leadership Academy to carry out the 
pre-workshop study. 
 
c) For the workshop to succeed, it would be important that it is not seen to duplicate 
efforts and programmes.  In this regard, it would be helpful if it was also seen to 
be in harmony and dovetail with the AU’s peace and security agenda.  Indeed, 
this might be central for the securing of the AU’s endorsement of the workshop 
and its training activities.   
 
CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Dr. David Francis closed the conference with a vote of thanks.  On behalf of the Africa 
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, he thanked all those who had played a role in the 
success of the conference.  These included the participants, speakers, session 
moderators and the co-organizers, UNU/CRIS. He particularly expressed his appreciation 
to the representatives of the RECs for finding time to attend and speak at the conference.  
Finally he thanked colleagues at the University of Bradford for their support, and the 
Research Assistants at the Centre for their hard work in the preparations for the 
conference. 
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